Burundi Independence
Burundi Independence: Burundi’s first generation of independence began in 1962, when a number of power conflicts, including the lingering effects of century-old animosities, came together to create a complicated and fierce political war. When Crown Prince Rwagasore, the eldest son of the king and one of the organizers of the political party Union pour le progrès national (UPRONA), was assassinated in October 1961, Burundi’s promising and resilient start came to an abrupt end just months before the country’s formal transition to independence.
The large UPRONA coalition had been anchored by the prince. He had represented a middle ground and ensured its sustainability with his regal status. The UPRONA and the drive to form a wide alliance fell apart in his absence.
1962, a year marked by political stumbling and bloodshed, saw Burundi achieve political independence and break away from Rwanda. Two Batare from the other major political party, the Parti démocrate chrétien, were involved in a conspiracy that was discovered during the prince’s death investigation. The Batare were one of two rival factions within the royal family, along with the Bezi; they had benefited from colonialism and desired to hold onto their position of authority.
Newly independent Burundians learned the cynical lesson that, despite the bravery and effort put forth to create a broad-based democratic movement, one well-placed assassination could bring democracy to its knees and restore the status quo for those unwilling to share power.
This lesson was brought about by the revelation of their involvement in the prince’s death as well as the political destruction brought about by their inability to fill Rwagasore’s void. Politicians in the future would follow that lesson. However, the effectiveness of political violence was the direct lesson that political fanatics learned from Rwagasore’s murder in 1962. Others across the nation followed suit, committing acts of assassination, intimidation, and arson.
The prince’s father attempted to preserve political unity by using his personal influence and the idea that the monarchy was superior to and outside of common social groups as the UPRONA broke up into factions due to competing claims to the mantle of Rwagasore.
That common ground, however, weakened as the idea that intimidation was the “easy” way to gain political power spread, and the mwami’s (king’s) strategy became more oppressive. He openly violated Burundi’s constitution by becoming more autocratic between 1963 and 1965. An difficult balancing game, which the Mwami first played through the prime minister’s office before playing directly himself, is suggested by the pattern of his interventions.
Five prime ministers led Burundi from 1963 to 1965, including two Hutus, the most well-liked of whom was assassinated, a Tutsi, and Baganwa (members of the royal family) from each of the opposing factions.
The mwami took over the army and the national police, putting them under his exclusive authority, took over the national radio network, and refused to acknowledge newly elected lawmakers because he believed that the political balance was in danger. In an attempt to gain direct political control, he even appointed his own personal secretary as prime minister.
The mwami’s daring actions were his reaction to a growing trend of polarization between Hutus, who were quickly becoming politically skilled and aware of their potential for power in democratic politics, and a growing coalition of Baganwa and Tutsis, who reacted defensively to the threat of a democracy centered on Hutus.
Despite having a smaller population, the growing Tutsi lobby used a well-thought-out plan to counter the Hutus’ obvious numerical superiority. Politicians like Tutsi prime minister Albin Nyamoya were able to forge covert agreements with global powers because of the Cold War-era political climate and the strong interest from other countries in Burundi as a gateway to resource-rich Zaïre (Democratic Republic of Congo).
By manipulating the mwami into acknowledging China, he separated the king from his Western supporters in a cleverly planned maneuver. These actions were a combination of shrewd political scheming in Burundi and a desire for non-Western assistance by those who saw Western democracy as the cause of their political downfall.
By 1965, polarization, ambition, and tension had escalated to the point where the Mwami declared an absolute monarchy in July as a last resort. This action only served to heighten tensions on all fronts; it sparked a political explosion in October of that year that has been characterized in many ways as an insurrection, a coup, or a series of coups executed by Tutsi, and later Hutu, instigators.
The October upheaval ultimately resulted in the release of two waves of political violence that focused on Bujumbura, the epicenter of modern politics, and Muramvya, the epicenter of royal politics. Several hundred people were killed in the first wave of violence against Tutsi victims, including regular Tutsis living in rural communities in Muramvya who were slaughtered because they were unlucky enough to become the targets of opportunity rather than because of their political beliefs.
The Hutu political elite seemed to have the best chance of rising to the political forefront, while many Baganwa and Tutsis from the historically influential Muramvya family were left stunned and distraught.
Thus, the second wave of violence was directed at this group. This second wave focused on Bujumbura, where the army, led by Captain Michel Micombero, a young officer who had been personally chosen and elevated by the mwami, entered the power vacuum caused by the incapacity of the mwami and the injured prime minister to mount a successful defense.
A Tutsi from a small regional group that originated outside the kingdom’s center and had no clout at the royal court, Micombero was a political outsider. Micombero took advantage of the situation, projecting a neutral image through his outsider status and a dynamic image with his military authority.
Under Micombero’s leadership, army forces assassinated almost all of the recently elected Hutu lawmakers to the parliament as well as the bulk of the Hutu political elite, including labor and political leaders, in a matter of days.
Additionally, thousands of common Hutus were killed, especially in and around Muramvya, which served to appease Tutsi and Baganwa families. Following the murders, the Mwami escaped to Europe, important Hutu politicians were killed, imprisoned, or forced into exile, the Baganwa and Muramvya Tutsi families were momentarily marginalized, and Captain Micombero continued to hold the position of de facto leader. In two perfectly timed actions a year later, Micombero established his political supremacy.
He first helped 19-year-old Crown Prince Charles Ndizeye overthrow his father, install himself as prime minister, and install Micombero as his successor while on a tour to Burundi from Europe, where the royal family had remained. When the young king left on a state visit to a neighboring country in November 1966, Micombero took over, overthrew him, and proclaimed a republic.
Micombero’s declaration marked a significant change in Burundian politics. The long-standing Batare-Bezi aristocratic rivalry lost some of its significance when Burundi became a republic, and the Baganwa progressively merged into “Tutsi” politics. They had also been removed from the political scene by the slaughter of Hutu MPs in October 1965.
Therefore, the specific Tutsi faction that a political candidate came from was crucial in the politics of the new nation. From the southern province of Bururi, Micombero’s once politically insignificant group now holds important cabinet positions as well as important positions in the judiciary and economy.
By banning all political parties save the UPRONA, which he controlled, Micombero reduced the number of avenues for political advancement. And by governing the nation through a national revolutionary council—his mostly military inner circle—he effectively replaced the government. Micombero’s inner circle, which included his close associates, core gionalists, and relatives, controlled a large portion of the nation by 1968.
Now outside “the system,” monarchists and Hutus occasionally contested it using anonymous tracts and rumors, which became the standard instruments of the disempowered. In response to these threats, Micombero used his own more common tactics, including as mass arrests, treason charges, and death sentences.
Although his government had strict control over the political environment, it was unable to do the same in the economic sphere. The economic crisis that hit Burundi in 1968–1969 soon turned into a political tool used by “nonsouthern” Tutsi factions to target Micombero’s group. An anti-corruption campaign was used to express this intra-Tutsi rivalry. Micombero’s group detained a number of well-known nonsouthern Tutsi politicians in 1971, accused them of treason, and executed them.
But out of concern for criticism, the sentences were commuted. The overthrown King Ntare Charles Ndizeye entered this smoldering hostility in late March 1972. He was arrested and put under house arrest at Gitega, a town in the former kingdom’s heartland that lies next to Muramvya Province, within hours of his arrival.
The political fallout from the mwami’s presence became evident a month later. Micombero fired his government and the executive secretary of UPRONA on April 29, 1972. He also declared on the radio that the government had been targeted by “monarchists,” a term that is frequently used to refer to non-Southern Tutsis.
It was declared that the king had died during the process of being “rescued” and that “Hutu intellectuals” were the real perpetrators of the coup as events transpired, first in Bujumbura and the area around Gitega and later in southern Burundi.
Micombero organized the army to “restore order,” and it targeted Hutus in particular, especially those who had distinguished themselves by going beyond primary school or by engaging in local business. Between 100,000 and 200,000 people were killed in the army’s coordinated killing in April 1972, and another 200,000 fled to neighboring countries.
Both Hutu and many nonsouthern Tutsi voices were effectively silenced by the 1972 massacre, which Hutus have called a genocide. The international community, which preferred to refer to it as “tribal slaughter” rather than political bloodshed, merely mildly condemned it. But a certain apprehension between Burundi and foreign donors persisted, becoming Micombero a political liability to his nation.
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, a fellow officer and coregionalist, deposed him in 1976 and proclaimed a “second republic.” At first, Bagaza’s program was touted as inclusive and impartial under the pretense of democratic transformation. Bagaza spoke of national healing and social integration.
In addition to enacting universal adult suffrage and emphasizing the value of elections, he also built roads and made other infrastructure improvements, encouraged land reform, and banned the antiquated system of forced labor and overlordship. Bagaza counterbalanced these progressive actions by continuing to outlaw all parties except the UPRONA, winning the national elections without opposition, detaining and torturing alleged critics, including clergy, and expelling a significant number of foreign clergy in response to the ensuing uproar.
He restricted religious and cultural celebrations and outlawed some types of public gatherings. Bagaza kept Burundian society tightly bound, leaving little opportunity for personal initiative or autonomy due to the governmental, political, and security structures that reached all the way down to the grassroots level.
The tension reached a point in 1986–1987 when it appeared that only a coup could ease it. Pierre Buyoya, another “southern” Tutsi from the Bururi region, led the September 1987 coup. He was a military officer who promoted reconciliation and reform.
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