Mansa Musa Reign: The Richest Man In Africa’s History

During the era stretching through Mansa Musa reign (1312–1337) and that of his brother Sulayman, the Mali Empire reached its highest degree of accomplishment. This period lasted from 1312 until 1337. (1341–1360). Mali’s territory is believed to have extended from the headwaters of the river Niger and from where the Gambia and Senegal Rivers reach the Atlantic coast, all the way to the southern fringes of the Sahara and the country that is located beyond Timbuktu in the Niger Bend.

This period of time coincides with Mali’s greatest period of territorial expansion. The prosperity of Mali’s rulers (mansaw) was dependent on their control of commercial towns and routes to the goldfields in the interior of the country. Copper and salt were examples of highly valued imports that were subject to a high level of taxation, and the mansaw was able to amass large quantities of gold by demanding tribute from the producers.

The people of Mali came from a great number of different ethnic groups, many of which intermarried and spoke each other’s languages. These individuals included people who spoke dialects of the Mande language such as Maninka, Bamana, and Soninke, as well as members of nearby communities such as the Fula and the Dogon. Despite the fact that commerce played a significant role, the bulk of the population was involved in subsistence activities such as farming, fishing, and rearing cattle. Additionally, there were specialized artisan groups such as blacksmiths, leatherworkers, and potters.

The Arabic writings of al-‘Umari (1301–1349), who interviewed eyewitness informants in Cairo, Ibn Battuta (1304–1368), who visited Mali in 1352–1353; and the renowned Arab historian Ibn Khaldun (1332–406), who recorded oral historical traditions from Malian scholars, are the primary sources for the majority of the information about Mansa Musa that was recorded during his own time. The combined accounts of al-‘Umari and Ibn Battilta conjure up an image of a royal court in which the mansa resided in a tall pavilion and sat on a dais that was ornamented with ivory and silk under a dome that had an image of a golden bird the size of a falcon.

A gold hat and a crimson gown were the traditional garb for the mansa when attending ceremonial events. He was escorted by hundreds of musicians and armed slaves, and his royal insignia included a quiver and bow that he kept with him at all times. The enormous flag that announced Mansa Musa’s approach had a yellow emblem set against a background of red whenever he traveled by horseback. In Mande society, it was customary for the ruler to speak through an intermediary, known as a jeli.

When Ibn Battuta visited the Mali court (during the reign of Mansa Sulayman), the leading spokesperson of the court was adorned with fine silk brocade garments, a sword with a golden sheath, and boots with spurs. According to Ibn Battuta, any ordinary citizen who was called into the presence of the sovereign was required to go in ragged clothes in order to express his humility. Additionally, when the visitor was addressed by the mansa, he was required to strip down to the waist and sprinkle dust on his own head and back.

It is said that Mansa Musa was a devout Muslim, and the events that transpired on his visit to Mecca in the year 1324 helped propel him to fame beyond the borders of the Mali Empire. In accordance with the tradition of the area, Mansa Musa consulted a diviner in order to ascertain the most propitious time to leave Mali for a voyage that would last at least a year. This was done so that he might leave on the most fortunate day possible. He waited for the right time, which took nine months, during which time provisions for the trip were gathered from every part of the kingdom.

There were thousands of individuals in the mansa’s retinue when it set off, including members of the court, baggage carriers, and bodyguards. According to the Ta’rikh al-Fattash, which was published more than three centuries after the incident (about 1665), Mansa Musa was also joined by his older wife, Inari Kanuté, who had five hundred of her own attendants with her on the journey. After enduring months of hardship while traveling through the Sahara Desert, the royal caravan from Mali finally made it to Egypt, where it emerged near the pyramids in Cairo.

Both al-Umari and Ibn Khaldun heard from their informants that Mansa Musa left Mali with somewhere between 80 and 100 loads of gold, and that his extravagant spending throughout the journey, and particularly in Cairo, made his pilgrimage a sensational event. This information was passed on to al-Umari and Ibn Khaldun. An informant of al-Umari claims that Mansa Musa gave the sum of 50,000 dinars to Sultan al-Nasir as a gift upon his arrival, and that he was similarly kind to a great number of other people. Following the emperor of Mali’s visit to Cairo, the city was inundated with so much money that it caused a decline in the price of gold that lasted for more than a decade.

The religiosity of Mansa Musa and the refined behavior of his well-dressed associates left an impression on the witnesses in Cairo, and they were impressed. Multiple interviews were conducted with the emperor, during which he was questioned about his kingdom and the events that led up to his ascension to the position of mansa. The gift of richly ornamented robes of honor that Mansa Musa and his courtiers received from Sultan al-Nasir, along with saddled and bridled horses, the use of a palace for the duration of their visit, as well as pack animals and provisions for their onward journey to Mecca, was presented by the Sultan.

After spending close to three months in Cairo, the caravan from Mali continued its journey toward Mecca in the company of Egyptian travelers. While Mansa Musa was in Mecca, he was successful in persuading four shurafa, who were descendants of the family of the Prophet Muhammad, to go with him and their families all the way back to Mali. Ibn Khaldun reported that while traveling back to Cairo from Mecca, the Malians narrowly avoided disaster when they became separated from the larger Arab caravan and were forced to make their way to Suez, where they survived on fish until they were rescued.

The Malians narrowly avoided disaster when they became separated from the larger Arab caravan and were forced to make their way to Suez. As the pilgrims made their way back to Cairo, Mansa Musa discovered that the gold he had taken with him was no longer sufficient. As a result, he was forced to borrow money from the city’s merchants, which he eventually repaid with an extremely high rate of interest. Abu-Ishiq al-Sahili, a poet and architect from Andalusia, traveled back to Mali at the same time as Mansa Musa. Also accompanying Mansa Musa on this journey was a shurafa from Mecca.

It is thought that Al-Sahili built one of the mosques in Timbuktu after settling there. During his time in Mansa Musa’s capital, Al-Sahili designed and constructed an ornate palace topped with a dome. It is believed that Mansa Musa, by means other than the exorbitant expenditures he made during the legendary journey, was the one who established Mali’s reputation as a great nation well beyond the borders of his imperial territories. He promoted Islamic knowledge by delivering students to Fez in order for them to receive an education there, and he established diplomatic ties between himself and the monarch of Morocco.

In order to accomplish this goal, high-ranking nobles from each kingdom were traded with one another and given the role of ambassador. Relations that were mutually advantageous were maintained with the heirs of these monarchs until the latter half of the fourteenth century, when Mali and Morocco were both victimized by dynastic rivalry. Before embarking on his well-known journey, Mansa Musa gave his son Magha the responsibility of ruling the kingdom in his absence. After Mansa Musa’s death in 1337, Magha once again took leadership of the kingdom.

Because of his ascension, Musa’s brother Sulayman, who was traditionally the eldest male in the family, was stripped of the power that had traditionally been theirs. Sadly, Magha passed away within the first four years, and Sulayman was elevated to the position of mansa at that point. Ibn Khaldun called Mansa Sulayman a cruel and oppressive king, but despite this, Mansa Sulayman was able to keep the empire that had grown and prospered under the wise and kind rule of Mansa Musa during the empire’s golden age.

Also Read: Did The Dahomey Empire Sell Slaves During The 18th Century?

Oba Ewuare Trade with the Portuguese

It was during the reigns of the Oba Ewuare (r. c.1440–1473), his son Ozolua (r. c.1481–1504), and his grandson Esigie that the kingdom of Benin, which was located in the Yorubaland in present-day southwestern Nigeria, reached its zenith in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Benin was located in the Yorubaland (r.1504–1547). In order to solidify his hold on power, Ewuare relied on his subjects’ conviction that kings possessed divine qualities.

The king was revered and feared because it was believed that he could influence things like the climate, fertility, harvests, and social harmony. On the basis of this information, Ewuare put into effect reforms with the intention of reducing the power of the uzama, which are hereditary chiefs who traditionally take part in the selection of the oba.

To remove their influence over the order of succession to the throne, he established the principle of primogeniture as the governing principle. This rule was eventually implemented by the chiefs themselves, which stymied the growth of large lineage support groups and added more power to the Oba Ewuare. Ewuare, on the other hand, required chiefs in order to oversee the day-to-day administration of the kingdom and to collect tributes from the villages, the majority of which contributed to his financial holdings.

In order to further dilute the authority of the uzama, he appointed additional “town” and “palace” chiefs, all of whom were directly beholden to him. Over the course of a century, there were many shifts in the king’s level of authority.

The expansion of Benin’s empire, on the other hand, was largely unaffected by palace skirmishes. Ewuare and his successors frequently conducted military operations during the dry season in order to extend Benin’s frontiers in all directions: eastward to the Niger delta, southward to the sea, and westward into Yoruba country. As a result of these victories, Ewuare was dubbed “Ewuare the Great,” and his son, Ozolua, was dubbed “Ozolua the Conqueror.”

The vitality and stability of the kingdom were displayed in a variety of different ways throughout the century that was dedicated to expansion. Eware reconstructed the nation’s capital, Benin City, and partitioned it into two parts: the larger part housed the majority of the city’s inhabitants, while the smaller part was reserved for the royal palace and the country’s most prominent citizens. Additionally, he enhanced communication by issuing orders for the construction of broad avenues and smaller streets that intersected with each other.

Benin was a city that had walls and moats surrounding it and measured 25 miles in circumference during the sixteenth century. The creative industries thrived. Casting techniques in Benin were improved by craftsmen as more copper and brass were brought into the country via trade. They produced bronze bas-reliefs that represented the Oba, his court, and his interactions with the Portuguese, in addition to the palace art and elaborate altar pieces that they were known for producing. These remind me of the medieval tapestries that were popular in Western Europe.

They are an important historical record. According to tradition, Ewaure was the first Oba of Benin to make contact with the Portuguese, who were at that time exploring the region. This may be a reference to Ruy de Sequeira’s journey to Africa in 1472. There is a good chance that European goods arrived in Benin before the arrival of Europeans themselves.

According to the writings of Portuguese eyewitnesses, when the Portuguese first arrived in Benin, they discovered a large centralized state that was already engaged in political and commercial relations with a number of different regions, some of which were quite far away.

At that time, the Portuguese were the only Europeans interested in conducting business in the area. By the 1480s, their strategy consisted of making the trade with the Guinean coasts a monopoly for the Portuguese. Their forts and ships stationed in the region were designed to keep other Europeans out of the region as much as they were intended to control the local African population. The Portuguese believed that forming an alliance with Benin would provide them with access to substantial markets for their own wares.

Through its interactions with Europeans, Benin was able to acquire firearms, powder, metals, salt, and cloth. In return, they provided the Europeans with palm oil, ivory, cloth, beads, pepper, and slaves. It does not appear that any of the other exports came from local sources, with the exception of slaves, who were a natural by-product of the wars that Benin fought.

It appears that Benin’s location at a junction of east-west and north-south trade was one of the factors that contributed to the country’s wealth. Pepper was the only commodity that Benin initially exported to Europe (before the Portuguese were successful in establishing their spice trade with Asia), and only a small number of slaves made their way to the continent.

Beads, cloth, and slaves were some of the first things the Portuguese traded for gold in African ports along the Gulf of Guinea. Gold was the commodity from West Africa that the Portuguese desired more than anything else at the time. Benin, on the other hand, was never heavily involved in the slave trade despite Portugal’s growing interest in slaves throughout the entirety of the sixteenth century. The Portuguese initially sought slaves to supplement the labor force in Portugal; later, they sought slaves to work on newly established Portuguese plantations off the west African coast and in the Gulf of Guinea.

Benin, however, did not become heavily involved in the slave trade. The Portuguese had difficulty conducting business with Benin due to the fact that the kingdom was located approximately 80 kilometers (50 miles) inland. They constructed a fort in the year 1487 at a location known as Ughoton (Gwato), which was the closest their ships could get to Benin City.

They had to travel approximately 40 miles inland from the ocean via perilous rivers in order to get there, and even then, the only way to get to the capital was via an additional 19 miles of land travel. Benin maintained control over both the rivers and the land routes.

Labor was the foundation of authority in this region; the Portuguese were few in number and were forced to rely on the native people of the area for military support, fresh water, and provisions. They were only able to conduct business in Benin with the Oba and his authorized agents on the terms that he had established. They left Ughoton after about 30 years because they found the Oba’s conditions to be too onerous, particularly the new ban on the export of male slaves. In later times, individual Portuguese merchants hailing from the Gulf of Guinea islands were responsible for the majority of commercial activity.

Despite this, the Portuguese departure from Ughoton did not mark the end of relations. It would appear that both Europeans and Africans were exploring the possibilities of what they could learn from one another. Oba Esigie sent a delegation to Portugal in 1514, complaining about Portuguese slaving activities and asking for a Christian mission and firearms at the same time. Oba Esigie’s request was granted. The provision of firearms was Benin’s top priority when it came to the Portuguese. On the other hand, King Manuel I was hesitant about selling weapons to pagan people.

The Portuguese took this request to be the chance they had been hoping for and had been waiting for all along. Even though he learned Portuguese, permitted the establishment of a Christian mission, and allowed his son Orhogba and some officials to be baptized, the oba did not accept baptism for himself. In reality, the oba was far less interested in Christianity than he was in acquiring firearms. By the end of the century, there was almost no longer any contact between the Portuguese and Benin.

Also Read: British invasion of the Benin Kingdom in 1897

What is the cause of the conflict between Hutus and Tutsis?

From April 7 through mid-July 1994, the Rwandan government conducted a systematic campaign of elimination against civilians whom it considered to be national “enemies.” At least 800,000 people were killed in massacres carried out across the country. Initially, the targets of this execution were existing or potential political opponents of the government, particularly prominent members of opposition parties and their families, referred to as “political enemies.”

Following that, the ethnically Hutu-dominated administration stigmatized all members of the Tutsi minority ethnic group, regardless of age, gender, or ideas, as “historical foes.” The killing, which began in Kigali and then spread into a government-directed nationwide genocide, occurred in the presence of international witnesses, including diplomats, aid workers, and even United Nations (UN) peacekeeping troops, who failed to prevent it, despite numerous warning signals, and who failed to stop it once it was underway.

The context in which “enemies” were identified and plans to exterminate them came together was one of intense international pressure on Rwanda’s authoritarian single-party regime to “open up” to multiparty democracy and negotiate with an armed group of refugees who had attacked from neighboring Uganda and declared their right to return. These two previously independent developments appeared almost simultaneously in late 1990. Over the next four years, the two became inexorably linked in the “official” rhetoric of Rwanda’s leadership, which grew increasingly paranoid, defensive, and fanatical.

The government promoted the idea that the two were part of a larger plot to destroy the country and restore the harsh exploitation of the Hutu majority by a small minority of Tutsi nobles that had existed in Rwanda for seven decades, from the 1890s to 1961. The autonomous Rwandan government, on the other hand, was directed by a small elite group called the akazu (or “the family,” in the sense of the mafia). This small group of close associates of then-President Juvenal Habyarimana wielded tight, largely unchallenged control over all matters political, military, administrative, and financial.

Beginning in late 1990, this control was progressively challenged (or, in the opinion of the akazu, endangered) by members of newly formed opposition parties and incursions by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, an armed refugee group (RPF). Opposition party members work hard to increase their party’s membership and secure government positions, frequently through intimidation and violence. Several parties, most notably the dominant Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement and its main opponents, such as the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain, made significant investments in their youth wings, using them to both encourage and frighten new members.

Party volunteers also worked to intimidate, weaken, or openly assault other parties’ local-level administrators, hoping to acquire political capital by rendering them useless. By mid-1992, chronic political issues had immobilized administration in numerous areas, allowing locals to disobey authority. As Rwanda descended into massive civil disobedience and political bloodshed, its president faced repeated invasions by the RPF, which had established a firm foothold in the country’s north in early 1992.

This achievement provided the RPF with enough international clout to drive Habyarimana to the bargaining table during a series of international-brokered peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania, in mid-1992. He was pressed to agree to a cease-fire in July of that year. He signed the first of a series of agreements known as the Arusha Accords in August 1992.

The accords established a new structure for Rwanda’s government, ensuring power-sharing with the RPF as well as internal opposition parties. Although these concessions attracted sympathy (and, more importantly, economic aid) outside Rwanda, they were met with derision within the country. Habyarimana was very aware of the political cost of peace talks, so he criticized them at home while praising them to make foreign donors happy.

The “double” process of negotiating peace with the RPF while silently allowing and even committing acts of political and ethnic violence escalated during 1993. The RPF breached the cease-fire in February, killing hundreds of people. This violation shattered an alliance formed between the RPF and the Rwandan opposition, splintered opposition groups, and sparked a “Hutu Power” coalition. Hutu Power supporters hoped to bridge political divides by instilling anti-Tutsi fear and hostility.

Many people were predisposed to listen to the anti-RPF and anti-Tutsi propaganda spewing from a new, akazu-controlled radio station, Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM), which began broadcasting in April 1993. The station catered to the young, who were drawn in by the station’s fashionable music, fast-paced programming, and witty commentary. Many grownups were unconcerned about it. This changed abruptly in 1993, when a political disaster overtook neighboring Burundi. Burundi’s first democratically elected president, a Hutu, was assassinated on October 21 by his country’s Tutsi-dominated army.

Burundi’s painstakingly formed Tutsi-Hutu political coalition crumbled quickly, replaced by horrific violence. This massive catastrophe was all that the Rwandan Hutu Power movement needed to convince their people that cooperating with the Tutsi-dominated RPF was a recipe for disaster. What is the cause of the conflict between Hutus and Tutsis? In late 1993 and early 1994, there was distrust, hostile language about the Hutu need for preemptive self-defense against all Tutsis, increased militia training, and secret arms depots.

When the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) arrived in Rwanda in December 1993 to help with the implementation of the Arusha Accords, they discovered indications of clandestine arming of people. The UNAMIR reports on clandestine civilian defense actions became more clear, precise, and urgent as the weeks went by.

However, the reports garnered little attention from UN headquarters. The peace accords drew international attention. President Habyarimana’s plane was targeted with missiles fired from a site near Kigali airport on the evening of April 6, 1994, as he returned from peace talks in Tanzania.

Everyone on board the plane died, including Habyarimana, his chief of staff, and the president of Burundi. As of this writing, the identity of the assassin is unknown. Within hours of the incident, elite military troops, including the presidential guard, rushed through Kigali’s streets, erecting roadblocks, barricading major members of the political opposition inside their homes, and removing Hutu Power figures.

Later that night, they began assassinating opposition leaders and their families, aided by regular army units and members of youth militias. Armed soldiers and militia men brandishing lists of named “enemies,” mostly Hutu political heavyweights who had failed to embrace Hutu Power, as well as some famous Tutsis, trolled Kigali’s middle-class areas, breaking into residences and killing their targets by the morning of April 7.

Meanwhile, senior Hutu Power and Akazu members gathered to plot and suggest presidential candidates. Even as they dealt with the FAR’s kidnapping, torture, and death of UN servicemen, UNAMIR officers urged the Rwandan military (Forces Armées Rwandaises, or FAR) to restore calm. UNAMIR also struggled to persuade decision-makers at the UN headquarters in New York to widen its mission in order for the agency to respond effectively to the highly sensitive situation.

By the evening of April 7, and over the next several days, with UNAMIR troops present but under strict orders limiting their capacity to respond, the massacre had expanded from the capital city to specific rural areas where Hutu Power had been most active and organized. This growth was incited by RTLM presenters, who urged listeners to find “enemies”—specifically, Tutsis and their moderate Hutu “accomplices” who were portrayed as RPF clandestine agents—and “defend” themselves forcefully.

The news that the RPF had resumed hostilities reinforced this message. Many Hutus initially worried for their lives after learning that the first wave of massacres had targeted Hutu politicians. However, by the end of the first week, the interim administration had circulated the idea that Hutus were not the goal, and that they should not allow divisions among them to divert their attention from the “true” enemy—all Tutsis. As a result, Rwanda was thrust into a complicated sequence of interconnected crises within days of Habyarimana’s killing. The little country was embroiled in an internal power struggle between opportunistic and radical political patrons eager to command their clients to perpetrate massacres in order to outmaneuver their opponents.

It faced abandonment and apathy from an international community that chose to evacuate most foreign nationals, limit the mandate and size of the UNAMIR force, and even urge the UN (in vain) to a total UNAMIR withdrawal. This apathy on the part of the world community created a permissive environment in which the atrocities grew into a full-fledged genocide.

Tutsi civilians were slaughtered in large-scale murders at public venues such as churches and schools, where they had assembled voluntarily, seeking protection, or had been instructed to gather in the days and weeks following the evacuations. Hundreds of Tutsi civilians were concentrated at a specific spot, detained or “protected” by police and/or troops for several days, then attacked with grenades, followed by a close-range assault by a civilian throng armed with machetes, clubs, hammers, and the rare rifle.

As the killings became more frequent and widespread, Rwandans who stood firm in their opposition—including some police, military, and regional administrative officials—were ostracized, intimidated, undermined, sacked, or assassinated. The governmental apparatus was organized to eliminate an entire minority community under the hands of a small cadre of radicals, most notably Colonel Théoneste Bagosora. As this complicated disaster evolved on Rwanda’s hillsides, the United Nations and world leaders focused on how to refer to it rather than how to stop it.

If what had now become a systematic killing of Tutsis was recognized as genocide, the UN and nations that had signed the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide were legally obligated to interfere. However, with the exception of France (which assisted in arming and training the FAR and began the unilateral Operation Turquoise in late June), those governments with the ability to lead a UN intervention distanced themselves from the conflict.

Humanitarian organizations, on the other hand, mobilized to aid Rwandan refugees (one group fleeing the genocide, the other fleeing the RPF’s advance) who fled to neighboring countries. The UN Security Council did not agree to label the Rwandan situation as genocide until June. It was typically too late by this point; more than 80% of all victims had been slain in the first six weeks of the crisis.

More people were killed as the RPF advanced effectively against the FAR in May and June. Hutu authorities screamed angrily for the “patriotic” annihilation of any Tutsis who had survived previous killings. As it gained control, the RPF massacred Hutu civilians both along and behind the front lines.

The RPF took Kigali on July 4, 1994, after heavy combat hill by hill and street by street. The bloodthirsty “interim” government retreated northward, then westward into Zaire in retaliation. As it retreated, the vanquished government declared via the mobile RTLM radio station that the fate that all Hutus feared, a “Tutsi takeover,” had now come to pass. Hutus had to flee for their lives in order to avoid being slaughtered.

Terrified, devastated, and fearful of retaliation, one million Rwandans, nearly all of them Hutus, fled in a matter of days. The humanitarian disaster that resulted from their flight was heartbreaking and documented on global television. The corpse-strewn land they left behind would not attract the world’s attention until much later, as the full scope of what had happened was only gradually understood.

Also Read: Angolan War Of Independence: The Angola Civil War For Independence, 1974-1976