Author

Historian2

Browsing

Khoikhoi Dutch Wars

Khoikhoi Dutch Wars Khoikhoi Dutch Wars Khoikhoi Dutch Wars

Khoikhoi Dutch Wars: The territory where the Dutch East India Company settled at the Cape had been inhabited for well over a millennium by Khoikhoi pastoralists and herders. San hunter-gatherers had come before them, however by the seventeenth century, many of them had fled to more isolated mountain locations.

Although there are indications that this local market for metals was becoming saturated by the early seventeenth century, European ships arriving at Table Bay had been obtaining cattle and sheep from the Khoi in exchange for copper and iron since the sixteenth century. The Khoi herders’ seasonal pastorage was infringed upon when the Dutch constructed a “fort and garden” on the shores of Table Bay and then introduced arable cultivation in 1658.

This was rejected by the Khoi, who insisted on grazing their cattle as before and tore down the hedges that had been put up to keep them out. When open warfare erupted in 1659–1660, the free burghers organized a military company and evacuated their families to the fort’s increased security. Conflicts persisted even after an uncomfortable truce.

Khoikhoi Dutch Wars Khoikhoi Dutch Wars Khoikhoi Dutch Wars

The Khoikhoi of the Boland and Saldanha Bay districts were relegated to tributary status, lost their cattle, and were defeated in a series of Dutch invasions in the 1670s. This territory was later seized by the Dutch East India Company through conquest, and it was divided up for settlement farms.

As a direct result of their loss of economic independence, some Khoikhoi started working on the farms alongside imported slaves. The smallpox pandemic of 1713 severely decimated the Khoi, but the loss of grazing land previously had been the key to their downfall.

Despite not being legally enslaved, they were gradually placed under corporate control and forced to rely on settlers for work and sustenance. This pattern of antagonism persisted as some Dutch settlers pushed their operations farther inland and adopted pastoralism.

The Khoikhoi were denied access to water and pasture resources to the north, and settler commandos occasionally stole cattle from them. There is unmistakable proof that by the early eighteenth century, some Khoi had been reduced to the hunter-gatherer lifestyle of the San, fleeing to the more isolated and arid regions of the Roggeveld or the highlands of the Cederberg.

Beyond the Piketberg, the Khoikhoi and San engaged in a protracted phase of guerilla resistance against European colonial farmers in the late 1730s. After Namaqua livestock were taken by settlers on an unauthorized trading mission to Little Namaqualand in 1739, this became more intense.

Some of the Khoi who had accompanied them apparently joined the Namaqua and raided Dutch farms and cattle in the Bokkeveld because they were unhappy with their portion of the booty. By sending a strong commando to the area, murdering several Khoi “rebels,” and so allowing settler theft of Namaqua livestock, the firm was only able to regain control of the area.

Khoikhoi Dutch Wars Khoikhoi Dutch Wars

Although guerrilla-style resistance persisted in the Bokkeveld and Roggeveld mountains until the end of the century, settlers eventually took control of the Onder Bokkeveld’s grazing fields. Conflict over environmental resources resurfaced from the 1770s until about 1800 when colonial pastoralists pushed further north.

Consequently, the armed trekboer commando gained more stability in order to fight against Khoikhoi and San resistance as well as to apprehend women and children who were to be exploited as indentured servants. By using tactics like the forced pass-carrying by “Bastaard Hottentots” (the children of Khoikhoi and slaves, or Khoikhoi and colonists), settlers also exerted control over native workers.

By the late eighteenth century, many Khoikhoi, San, and runaway slaves had fled to Namaqualand and the Orange (Gariep) River region, where they established autonomous Oorlam captaincies (later known as the Griqua) as a result of these battles and struggles.

For instance, in the 1790s, the well-known Oorlam chieftain Jager Afrikaner escaped with his family to the islands of the Gariep River after killing a white settler in the Hantam district with whom he had formed a clientship relationship over grazing rights.

From there, he recruited more Khoi and San refugees as followers and conducted raids on the neighboring regions, including Nama and Dutch grazing grounds. After being banned from the Cape, he moved to Namibia in 1806, where missionaries converted him and he began hunting and trading.

In the meantime, settlers were dominating grazing and water resources by moving eastward along the south Cape coast. In the process, they drove out a large portion of the wildlife that San hunters relied on and drove Khoikhoi pastoralists, who were already weakened by the flood of Khoi refugees from the west, toward the Karoo and Camdeboo regions.

The fertile grazing grounds between the Gamtoos and Fish rivers, which were also utilized by Xhosa farmers and herders, had been overrun by settlers by the 1770s. The corporation established a landdrost (magistracy) at Graaff-Reinet in 1786, formally extending the colony to this area.

As a result, the 1770s and 1790s saw a protracted era of strife. Susan Newton-King (1999), a historian, has shown that the necessity for settlers to acquire war prisoners was at least partially responsible for the increased violence during this time. Settler commandos frequently kidnapped Khoi and San women and children, along with a few men, to use as bonded inboekseling labor because they lacked the funds to hire waged labor.

Khoikhoi Dutch Wars Khoikhoi Dutch Wars Khoikhoi Dutch Wars

Since they no longer had access to cattle and pasturage, other Khoi and San were forced to serve as herders for the hikers. However, there was some reprisal for this. By the middle of the 1790s, the frontier meat trade was severely hampered by Khoisan resistance, which manifested itself in the form of direct attacks on settlers and their slaves as well as stock theft.

When Khoikhoi and San inboekselings abandoned the farms in 1799, organized into captaincies based on precolonial social systems, and launched a four-year struggle to retake the “country of which our fathers have been despoiled,” a great uprising ensued. The 1799–1803 insurrection was very different from previous Khoikhoi and San resistance in a number of respects. Those who had already lost the means to live independently, worked for the trek boers, and wanted to topple colonial society from within rather than just stop its geographical growth were the first to rebel.
Additionally, the rebels joined forces with the Zuurveld Xhosa chiefs, who were successfully fending off colonial advances in the area.

In addition to raiding the regions of Graaff Reinet and Swellendam and defeating a settler commando, they also forced the abandonment of other farms. The new colonial rulers who had seized the Cape from the Dutch East India Company—the British and, for a short time, the Dutch Batavian administration—decisively intervened in response to the threat this constituted to the colonial order.

Conflicts between the Khoi and the Xhosa ultimately resulted in a peace in 1803. The uprising was the Khoisan people’s final sustained resistance to settler occupation. Few Khoi or San still had independent access to land at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The British attempted to force them into field labor with laws like the Caledon Code (1809). Ordinance 50 (1828) lifted these restrictions, and while independent farming was discouraged, efforts were made to settle some Khoi groups at mission stations or on land at Kat River. Some of them favored living with Xhosa farmers. Additional battles against the San, who were uprooted by the fencing of settler pastorage, occurred in the Northern Cape in the 1860s and 1870s. This amounted to genocide in certain locations.

Also Read: The Incredible Rise and Fall of the Busaidi Sultanate in East Africa

Cabinda History

Cabinda History Cabinda History Cabinda History

Cabinda History: The ongoing separatist insurgency in Cabinda came into focus when the fight between the Angolan government and UNITA rebels ended in April 2002. The Angolan government and several separatist groups have been engaged in a decades-long war of independence in Cabinda, an oil-rich enclave that is divided from the rest of Angola by a narrow strip of DRC territory.

This conflict has been dubbed “Africa’s forgotten war.” Over the course of nearly 30 years of independence efforts, about 30,000 people have died. Only individuals employed in the oil industry have been able to enter the enclave, despite the dire humanitarian situation.

Due to Cabinda’s enormous oil wealth, the enclave is both a hotly debated location and a vital part of Angola’s national economy. About 60% of Angola’s oil is produced in the Cabinda oil fields. The province is the primary source of Angolan oil revenues, which account for 90% of the state budget and 42% of the country’s GDP.

Block Zero, Cabinda’s offshore deposit, is the foundation of Angola’s petroleum industry and one of the most profitable oil fields in the world. Block Zero’s concession rights were first given in 1957, and exploration soon followed. Block Zero has produced over two billion barrels of oil since production began in 1968.

Gulf had contributed $1.3 billion to the Cabindan venture by 1983, which accounted for 90% of Angola’s foreign exchange earnings. Significant additional development and production investments were made in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1997, the enclave’s oil exports totaled $2.5 billion. Angola produced about 800,000 barrels per day by 2000, nearly six times as much as it had in the 1980s.

As a result, Angola became the second-largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa, after Nigeria. From its operational base at Malongo, which is close to colonial territory, Chevron Texaco has dominated the development of the province. Private security firms monitor the company’s facility, which is isolated from the rest of Cabinda and has a small refinery, oil storage depots, and a residential area for Chevron employees.

Cabinda History Cabinda History Cabinda History

There is a lot of animosity over the differences in living conditions, and local employees do not reside in the settlement. This has increased local discontent about outsiders’ exploitation of the region’s abundant resources. The role that oil firms play in the area has been harshly criticized by Cabindans. Fish stocks were seriously harmed in 1999 by an oil spill close to the Malonga base.

Fishermen in Cabinda have demanded compensation for the damage caused by oil leaks, but Chevron Texaco has only given them US$2000, and barely 10% of them have gotten this money. Reduced fish stocks have also been linked to continuous pollution from routine production in addition to spills.

A major source of contention since colonial times has been Cabinda’s relationship with Angola. The Treaty of Simulambuco in 1885 recognized Cabinda’s unique status as an enclave and politically connected the region to Angola.

Prior to 1956, when it was merged into Angola and placed directly under the control of the Portuguese governor-general of Angola, Cabinda was a Portuguese colony. Cabinda has maintained its geographic, linguistic, and ethnic ties to what are now Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo, despite its official ties to Angola.

Cabinda History Cabinda History Cabinda History

Separatists claim that Cabinda should have been given its own independence after Portuguese colonial rule ended, and many Cabindans have always maintained that their region is autonomous. In 1960, when armed resistance to Portuguese rule in Angola began to take shape, the Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda, the country’s first independence movement, was established.

At about the same time, two more organizations came into being: the Maiombe Alliance and the Committee for Action and Union of Cabinda. Together, the three movements formed the Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) in 1963.

In order to prepare for Angolan independence, the FLEC was not allowed to take part in the Alvor negotiations in April 1974 between the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, three Angolan nationalist organizations, and the Portuguese colonial government. Cabinda would continue to be an essential component of Angola, according to Article 3 of the Alvor Accord, which was signed in January 1975.

After FLEC’s appeals to the UN and the Organization of African Unity failed to provide them with adequate support, they turned to armed conflict with the Angolan MPLA government. Attacks on government forces based in Angola and the sporadic abduction of Chevron workers occurred during the guerrilla conflict that followed.

Due to strategic disagreements, FLEC broke up into FLEC-Renovada and FLEC-FAC, the organization’s principal armed faction, in the 1980s. Although FLEC-FAC has continued to engage in some violent acts, its support was significantly undermined in 1996 when Mobutu Sese Seko, the president of Zaïre, was overthrown.

The Cabindan separatists were likewise left out of the 1991–1992 negotiations between the Angolan government and the UNITA that resulted in the signing of the Bicesse Accords. They carried on the war in the enclave after being excluded from the peace deal. Fighting continued unabated in 1994 after the Lusaka Protocol, a new peace deal, once again excluded the Cabindan separatists.

A 2002 symposium on Angola’s constitutional future, which was held in Angola and covered topics significant to Cabindans such as local autonomy, decentralization, and constitutional reform, was not attended by FLEC-FAC. Meetings throughout the 1990s among the various Cabindan independence parties and the Angolan government brought no settlement to the dispute. The Cabindan rebels were unable to use the DRC and the Republic of Congo as bases of operations because of the Angolan government’s involvement in both conflicts. Cabindan complaints about the province’s lack of development and infrastructure have been addressed by the Angolan government since the 1990s. Only 10% of oil earnings are still given back to the province.

The Angolan government, like the Portuguese government before it, would never voluntarily relinquish independence to the enclave because of Cabinda’s oil resources. FLEC-FAC’s main base was destroyed, and many independence fighters were forced to leave the guerrilla battle when Angolan forces conducted a large sweep of the enclave in October 2002 with the goal of forcing secessionists out of Cabinda.

FLEC-Renovada ceased operations after the army also took control of its main base at the end of the year. The 2002 offensive that militarily defeated FLEC left its leaders in exile and renewed government hopes for an end to the lengthy conflict.

There were also indications that a negotiated settlement was imminent after Angolan authorities met with FLEC leader and cofounder Ranque Franque in July 2003. Although FLEC leaders were open to negotiating a settlement after the military setback, the success of peace negotiations will largely depend on whether or not civil society organizations participate in the process.

A cease-fire, an end to the Angolan Army’s abuses of human rights (which included atrocities against civilians), and better rights and working conditions for local oil workers are among the demands made by civil society organizations.

Cabinda History Cabinda History

The Portuguese government, which sees the crisis as an internal Angolan matter, has rebuffed calls by the separatists for Portugal to step in and form a transitional administration. The government, which maintains that all Angolans should vote on a matter of national importance, has also rejected FLEC’s calls for an independence referendum, akin to the one conducted in East Timor and overseen by the UN, in which only Cabindans would cast ballots.

Many Cabindans would now accept autonomy, which the Angolan government has stated it would be open to negotiating, even though they still long for independence.

Also Read: The Incredible Cultures of the Kasai Region

M23 Rebel Group

M23 rebel group

The Congolese government and the M23 rebel group, which is supported by Rwanda, have reached a comprehensive ceasefire to end the fighting in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). A permanent cessation of air, sea, and land-based hostilities is part of the deal, which was made in Doha, Qatar. Additionally, it outlaws hate speech, sabotage, and any attempt to annex additional territory through force.

Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Qatar, praised the development. “With a commitment to responsibly implement the agreement’s articles, the Declaration of Principles signed today paves the way for direct negotiations towards a comprehensive peace that addresses the conflict’s underlying causes,” he said.

Both parties have committed to working closely with regional and international organizations. A roadmap to restore state authority in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the government has long struggled to maintain control, is one of the main provisions.

Reaffirming national sovereignty is “a normal thing for any country,” according to U.S. Senior Advisor Massad Boulos, who also underlined the necessity of ongoing communication and perseverance.

The humanitarian effects of years of war are also covered in the pact. In compliance with international law, it guarantees the safe, voluntary, and respectable return of refugees and internally displaced people. The agreement also includes pledges to cooperate with regional civilian protection mechanisms and UN peacekeepers.

The last round of peace negotiations is scheduled to end on August 1.

Also Read: Sahel Alliance: Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali Unite to Combat Jihadist Violence 2025

Burundi Independence

Burundi Independence Burundi Independence Burundi Independence Burundi Independence

Burundi Independence: Burundi’s first generation of independence began in 1962, when a number of power conflicts, including the lingering effects of century-old animosities, came together to create a complicated and fierce political war. When Crown Prince Rwagasore, the eldest son of the king and one of the organizers of the political party Union pour le progrès national (UPRONA), was assassinated in October 1961, Burundi’s promising and resilient start came to an abrupt end just months before the country’s formal transition to independence.

The large UPRONA coalition had been anchored by the prince. He had represented a middle ground and ensured its sustainability with his regal status. The UPRONA and the drive to form a wide alliance fell apart in his absence.

1962, a year marked by political stumbling and bloodshed, saw Burundi achieve political independence and break away from Rwanda. Two Batare from the other major political party, the Parti démocrate chrétien, were involved in a conspiracy that was discovered during the prince’s death investigation. The Batare were one of two rival factions within the royal family, along with the Bezi; they had benefited from colonialism and desired to hold onto their position of authority.

Newly independent Burundians learned the cynical lesson that, despite the bravery and effort put forth to create a broad-based democratic movement, one well-placed assassination could bring democracy to its knees and restore the status quo for those unwilling to share power.

This lesson was brought about by the revelation of their involvement in the prince’s death as well as the political destruction brought about by their inability to fill Rwagasore’s void. Politicians in the future would follow that lesson. However, the effectiveness of political violence was the direct lesson that political fanatics learned from Rwagasore’s murder in 1962. Others across the nation followed suit, committing acts of assassination, intimidation, and arson.

The prince’s father attempted to preserve political unity by using his personal influence and the idea that the monarchy was superior to and outside of common social groups as the UPRONA broke up into factions due to competing claims to the mantle of Rwagasore.

Burundi Independence Burundi Independence

That common ground, however, weakened as the idea that intimidation was the “easy” way to gain political power spread, and the mwami’s (king’s) strategy became more oppressive. He openly violated Burundi’s constitution by becoming more autocratic between 1963 and 1965. An difficult balancing game, which the Mwami first played through the prime minister’s office before playing directly himself, is suggested by the pattern of his interventions.

Five prime ministers led Burundi from 1963 to 1965, including two Hutus, the most well-liked of whom was assassinated, a Tutsi, and Baganwa (members of the royal family) from each of the opposing factions.

The mwami took over the army and the national police, putting them under his exclusive authority, took over the national radio network, and refused to acknowledge newly elected lawmakers because he believed that the political balance was in danger. In an attempt to gain direct political control, he even appointed his own personal secretary as prime minister.

The mwami’s daring actions were his reaction to a growing trend of polarization between Hutus, who were quickly becoming politically skilled and aware of their potential for power in democratic politics, and a growing coalition of Baganwa and Tutsis, who reacted defensively to the threat of a democracy centered on Hutus.

Despite having a smaller population, the growing Tutsi lobby used a well-thought-out plan to counter the Hutus’ obvious numerical superiority. Politicians like Tutsi prime minister Albin Nyamoya were able to forge covert agreements with global powers because of the Cold War-era political climate and the strong interest from other countries in Burundi as a gateway to resource-rich Zaïre (Democratic Republic of Congo).

By manipulating the mwami into acknowledging China, he separated the king from his Western supporters in a cleverly planned maneuver. These actions were a combination of shrewd political scheming in Burundi and a desire for non-Western assistance by those who saw Western democracy as the cause of their political downfall.

By 1965, polarization, ambition, and tension had escalated to the point where the Mwami declared an absolute monarchy in July as a last resort. This action only served to heighten tensions on all fronts; it sparked a political explosion in October of that year that has been characterized in many ways as an insurrection, a coup, or a series of coups executed by Tutsi, and later Hutu, instigators.

The October upheaval ultimately resulted in the release of two waves of political violence that focused on Bujumbura, the epicenter of modern politics, and Muramvya, the epicenter of royal politics. Several hundred people were killed in the first wave of violence against Tutsi victims, including regular Tutsis living in rural communities in Muramvya who were slaughtered because they were unlucky enough to become the targets of opportunity rather than because of their political beliefs.

Burundi Independence Burundi Independence

The Hutu political elite seemed to have the best chance of rising to the political forefront, while many Baganwa and Tutsis from the historically influential Muramvya family were left stunned and distraught.

Thus, the second wave of violence was directed at this group. This second wave focused on Bujumbura, where the army, led by Captain Michel Micombero, a young officer who had been personally chosen and elevated by the mwami, entered the power vacuum caused by the incapacity of the mwami and the injured prime minister to mount a successful defense.

A Tutsi from a small regional group that originated outside the kingdom’s center and had no clout at the royal court, Micombero was a political outsider. Micombero took advantage of the situation, projecting a neutral image through his outsider status and a dynamic image with his military authority.

Under Micombero’s leadership, army forces assassinated almost all of the recently elected Hutu lawmakers to the parliament as well as the bulk of the Hutu political elite, including labor and political leaders, in a matter of days.

Additionally, thousands of common Hutus were killed, especially in and around Muramvya, which served to appease Tutsi and Baganwa families. Following the murders, the Mwami escaped to Europe, important Hutu politicians were killed, imprisoned, or forced into exile, the Baganwa and Muramvya Tutsi families were momentarily marginalized, and Captain Micombero continued to hold the position of de facto leader. In two perfectly timed actions a year later, Micombero established his political supremacy.

He first helped 19-year-old Crown Prince Charles Ndizeye overthrow his father, install himself as prime minister, and install Micombero as his successor while on a tour to Burundi from Europe, where the royal family had remained. When the young king left on a state visit to a neighboring country in November 1966, Micombero took over, overthrew him, and proclaimed a republic.

Micombero’s declaration marked a significant change in Burundian politics. The long-standing Batare-Bezi aristocratic rivalry lost some of its significance when Burundi became a republic, and the Baganwa progressively merged into “Tutsi” politics. They had also been removed from the political scene by the slaughter of Hutu MPs in October 1965.

Burundi Independence Burundi Independence Burundi Independence

Therefore, the specific Tutsi faction that a political candidate came from was crucial in the politics of the new nation. From the southern province of Bururi, Micombero’s once politically insignificant group now holds important cabinet positions as well as important positions in the judiciary and economy.

By banning all political parties save the UPRONA, which he controlled, Micombero reduced the number of avenues for political advancement. And by governing the nation through a national revolutionary council—his mostly military inner circle—he effectively replaced the government. Micombero’s inner circle, which included his close associates, core gionalists, and relatives, controlled a large portion of the nation by 1968.

Now outside “the system,” monarchists and Hutus occasionally contested it using anonymous tracts and rumors, which became the standard instruments of the disempowered. In response to these threats, Micombero used his own more common tactics, including as mass arrests, treason charges, and death sentences.

Although his government had strict control over the political environment, it was unable to do the same in the economic sphere. The economic crisis that hit Burundi in 1968–1969 soon turned into a political tool used by “nonsouthern” Tutsi factions to target Micombero’s group. An anti-corruption campaign was used to express this intra-Tutsi rivalry. Micombero’s group detained a number of well-known nonsouthern Tutsi politicians in 1971, accused them of treason, and executed them.

But out of concern for criticism, the sentences were commuted. The overthrown King Ntare Charles Ndizeye entered this smoldering hostility in late March 1972. He was arrested and put under house arrest at Gitega, a town in the former kingdom’s heartland that lies next to Muramvya Province, within hours of his arrival.

The political fallout from the mwami’s presence became evident a month later. Micombero fired his government and the executive secretary of UPRONA on April 29, 1972. He also declared on the radio that the government had been targeted by “monarchists,” a term that is frequently used to refer to non-Southern Tutsis.

It was declared that the king had died during the process of being “rescued” and that “Hutu intellectuals” were the real perpetrators of the coup as events transpired, first in Bujumbura and the area around Gitega and later in southern Burundi.

Micombero organized the army to “restore order,” and it targeted Hutus in particular, especially those who had distinguished themselves by going beyond primary school or by engaging in local business. Between 100,000 and 200,000 people were killed in the army’s coordinated killing in April 1972, and another 200,000 fled to neighboring countries.

Both Hutu and many nonsouthern Tutsi voices were effectively silenced by the 1972 massacre, which Hutus have called a genocide. The international community, which preferred to refer to it as “tribal slaughter” rather than political bloodshed, merely mildly condemned it. But a certain apprehension between Burundi and foreign donors persisted, becoming Micombero a political liability to his nation.

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, a fellow officer and coregionalist, deposed him in 1976 and proclaimed a “second republic.” At first, Bagaza’s program was touted as inclusive and impartial under the pretense of democratic transformation. Bagaza spoke of national healing and social integration.

In addition to enacting universal adult suffrage and emphasizing the value of elections, he also built roads and made other infrastructure improvements, encouraged land reform, and banned the antiquated system of forced labor and overlordship. Bagaza counterbalanced these progressive actions by continuing to outlaw all parties except the UPRONA, winning the national elections without opposition, detaining and torturing alleged critics, including clergy, and expelling a significant number of foreign clergy in response to the ensuing uproar.

He restricted religious and cultural celebrations and outlawed some types of public gatherings. Bagaza kept Burundian society tightly bound, leaving little opportunity for personal initiative or autonomy due to the governmental, political, and security structures that reached all the way down to the grassroots level.

Burundi Independence Burundi Independence

The tension reached a point in 1986–1987 when it appeared that only a coup could ease it. Pierre Buyoya, another “southern” Tutsi from the Bururi region, led the September 1987 coup. He was a military officer who promoted reconciliation and reform.

Also Read: How Europe Industrialization and Imperialism Shaped Africa’s History

Burundi history

Burundi History Burundi History Burundi History

Burundi History: When the region found itself on the newest frontline of European imperial expansion, the precolonial kingdom of Burundi, which had grown quickly through military conquest in the early nineteenth century under King Ntare Rugamba (c.1800–1850), was working to stabilize and consolidate these gains under King Mwezi Gisabo (c.1850–1908).

When a group of Catholic missionaries from the Société des Missionnaires d’Afrique, known as the White Fathers, founded a mission station near the present-day town of Rumonge on the shores of Lake Tanganyika in 1879, this expansion became noticeable. Despite not being directly under Burundian authority, this area was nonetheless within the kingdom’s political sphere of influence.

The mission station did not last long, either, since it was violently shut down in 1881 due to a dispute with Bikari, the local leader, over the priests’ attempt to “rescue” one of his retainers from what they saw as slavery. The White Fathers continued their attempts to settle in or close to the heavily populated kingdom in spite of this defeat.

Burundi History Burundi History Burundi History

While keeping an eye on and blocking the missionaries’ advancement, King Mwezi Gisabo faced a new kind of European incursion on the borders of his realm in 1896: a German military installation at the lake’s northernmost point.

Mwezi Gisabo was unaware that Germany had claimed his kingdom, which was shown on European maps as the Urundi area on German East Africa’s western border. In 1899, the king and the German officer in charge exchanged their first correspondence in a cordial and even amicable manner.

However, diplomacy broke down as a result of the Germans’ persistent presence under later, more aggressive officers. The German commander in command launched a vicious and destructive campaign against Mwezi in 1902 in an attempt to subdue him. This campaign, which was supported by a number of Mwezi’s personal adversaries, turned into a chase through the densely populated highlands of Burundi.

With his kingdom ravaged and many of his subjects in open rebellion, Mwezi Gisabo surrendered to his assailants in 1903. However, rather than being humiliated and losing politically, the king’s power was strengthened.

The colony’s governor in distant Dar es Salaam, whose political strategy focused on forging cooperative ties with African leaders, had explicitly ordered the German commander who had pillaged his country and forced Mwezi Gisabo to surrender to do so. Mwezi’s vanquisher was recalled within months, and the officer assigned to take his place sought to strengthen Mwezi’s position of power.

Mwezi was now under the protection of the Germans, who had attempted to destroy him. The decision to launch German military expeditions to pursue uncooperative regional leaders might, in fact, be influenced by the monarch. Mwezi regained control of his father’s kingdom with German assistance, even extending his rule into previously unruly areas.

The king and the German residents at Usumbura were forming a tenuous partnership by 1906, when German occupation changed from military to civilian control. It continued until the old king passed away in 1908. Collaboration broke out after Mwezi’s passing and the coronation of Mutaga, the teenage monarch who reigned from 1908 until 1915. Mutaga was king in name only, having only been enthroned after extensive manipulation.

In actuality, the kingdom was divided between his crafty and greedy paternal uncle Ntarugera and his mother Ririkumutima. Due to shifting favoritism at court, many provincial leaders—including princes—found their careers in jeopardy and turned to the Germans for assistance. The German Residents separated Urundi district into three political zones based on their political information and harsh criticism, which were ranked according to the degree of autonomy or allegiance to the central kingdom.

A quick succession of German residents attempted to incorporate Urundi district into the evolving framework of the broader colony in this precarious political environment. In order to manage through local connections rather than military expeditions, they established a series of outposts and moved the district headquarters to Gitega’s central location.

They introduced money and taxes to get the populace ready for an economic program centered on peasants. They started a spur up to Urundi and constructed a railway from Dar es Salaam to the port of Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika in order to connect Urundi, with its vast agricultural and labor potential, to the rest of the colony.

However, the start of World War I interrupted these efforts. German attacks against the Belgian Congo were launched from the western border of German East Africa. The Urundi soldiers and administration were involved in these activities. Amid this turmoil, King Mutaga died under unknown circumstances in November 1915.

Burundi History Burundi History Burundi History

In the spring of 1916, Urundi’s German administrators fled as Belgian troops from the Congo prepared to invade, and the royal court was engulfed in strife over the succession of a small child, Mwambutsa. From the middle of 1916 until 1924, when Belgium was officially given a mandate to govern by the League of Nations, Urundi was under Belgian military control. Belgium, Urundi’s globally acknowledged trustee, began deconstructing and restructuring Urundi’s political-administrative structure in a more practical manner.

The reorganization, which occurred in the 1930s, strengthened the power of members of a few branches of the royal family and their supporters while methodically disempowering a wide range of people who had previously held regional governing authority, such as independent leaders from strong local families, women, advisers, clients, and royal ritualists.

Force was used to quell the vehement resistance of some of the disempowered leaders, especially in areas that had previously enjoyed relative autonomy or had been ruled by revered ritualists. Following the eradication of opposition, the territories were taken and merged into a simplified and authoritarian three-tiered structure consisting of chefferies (run by Belgian-appointed chiefs), sous-chefferies (under Belgian-appointed subchiefs), and territoires (run by a Belgian and staffed by Burundians).

The White Fathers, who had remained active during the war and into the Belgian administration, sought to educate and convert people who would be the foundation of the new system as the colonial government reorganized the regional administrative structure. In order to focus education on the next generation of leaders, early mission schools almost exclusively targeted the sons of princes and well-known Tutsi pastoralists.

Young Christianized ladies from royal or well-known Tutsi families were their female counterparts and intended spouses. Nuns instructed them to adhere to the standards of Western-style domesticity and morals. King Mwambutsa and his wife, Thérèse Kanyonga (they were married in 1930), were at the center of this attempt to shape a Burundian colonial elite.

This young couple was the quintessential example of Belgian ambition and cunning. The colonial system of indirect control, which was operated by a large, regional network of Burundian administrators under the direction of a comparatively small number of Belgian officials, was operating quite successfully by the 1940s.

Peasant producers made up the great bulk of the population; they produced cash crops for the government, like tea or coffee, and largely subsisted on subsistence crops like peas, beans, corn, and cassava. Legally, these peasant farmers were classified as Hutu ethnic. The word “Hutu” originally meant “servant,” and it was also used to describe anyone with a low social standing who would be considered for service.

Burundi History Burundi History Burundi History

The elites of Urundi, on the other hand, identified as Tutsi, a term that originally applied to pastoralists and, as cattle was a significant source of income, also to the wealthy. The terms Hutu and Tutsi were used to refer to social reference points before colonization; as such, they were relative, adaptable, and susceptible to change in response to emerging social realities.

However, terms became established ethnic groupings under the Belgian colonial regime. According to the dominant societal “rule of thumb,” they identified the Hutu as the ethnic group that the system had overtly or more structurally and silently disempowered and the Tutsi as the ethnic group that the system had empowered.

The Belgian colonial system had produced a sizable underclass, most of whom were Hutu, and a minority privileged elite, almost all of whom were Tutsi (including members of the royal family who had been officially absorbed into the category). Urundi’s contemporary political basis was now based on potentially aristocratic and undemocratic notions when the colonial world was shaken by winds of revolution and independence in the 1950s.

Also Read: Botswana Independence: Its Incredible Economic Development And Politics

Trump budget Cut

Trump budget

Trump budget: The Trump administration’s decision to shut down USAID and cut funding for other help organizations is impacting international humanitarian organizations. These budget changes have had a major impact on Kenya’s two biggest refugee camps.

The Trump administration’s decision to reduce USAID continues to have an impact on the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya.

A smile is painted by the empty warehouses in the World Food Program’s food storage facilities at the camp.

Among the few supplies left for the entire refugee camp are a few bags of US-sourced lentils.

These US-sourced lentils are some of the last supplies left for the entire refugee camp, with warehouse supplies cut by 25%.

No more food has arrived since the US, the WFP’s biggest donor, stopped financing in February.

More than 300,000 refugees from countries like South Sudan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are housed in Kakuma, which is located in Kenya’s arid north.

WFP has been obliged to drastically cut food handouts due to a shortage of food. According to their assessment from August, over one-third of the refugees will not receive any food at all.

We see the food that Regina Ngole, who fled the South Sudanese conflict, prepares for her family of seven.

She only collected a few leaves that day.

The rice, oil, and lentils she received from WFP for June and July have already been depleted.

A community health worker has come to check on her since her two-year-old has frequent hospitalizations for acute malnutrition.

Her health has improved, but it’s unclear how long that will last.

The bulk of refugees rely on food rations; however, others have started enterprises or found employment within the camp.

Also Read: Trump Meets Five West African Leaders To Talk Trade And Development

Burkina Faso History

Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso: The Upper Volta’s valleys (Mouhoun, Nazinon, and Nakambe in modern-day Burkina Faso) were connected by the extensive network of trade routes that ran through the nineteenth century between the Sahel and the forest (as 180 TOGO Nazinon (Red Volta) was delineated by the explorer Heinrich Barth in 1853). The primary goods exchanged were slaves, livestock, salt, and cola nuts.

The Mossi and Gulmaba are two very homogeneous groups of people that each founded a group of roughly 20 kingdoms in the eastern portion of this region. The chiefs in a few of these kingdoms were essentially autonomous from the national authority. Conflict between these kingdoms persisted as pretenders often vied for dominance, but the more scattered pattern of settlement surely provided some security.

Islam permeated every part of the region, from the monarchs’ courts to the networks of traders who came from the Mande nation (mostly Yarse, from the Moaga’s homeland) in earlier centuries. A mosaic of peoples, the western part of the region lacked centralized institutions or hierarchies and acknowledged the power of hereditary chiefs and those holding religious positions associated with the worship of the creator deity, the land, rain, masks, and other elements.

Village communities (Bwa, Bobo, Marka, and San) and “clans” (Lobi, Birifor, and Dagara) existed, and the Wattara regiment of the Kong (present-day Côte d’Ivoire) dynasty had started to establish fledgling kingdoms around Sya (Bobo-Dioulasso) in the eighteenth century.

Their power had been significantly diminished, though, and some of their successors were now only in charge of their own settlements along the caravan routes. The Fulbe (or Peul) had started to establish a stable community to the north after migrating from the west in waves over many generations. The Gulma kingdom of Coalla was forced further southward by the Ferobe when they founded the emirate of Liptako at Dori around 1810.

Lastly, a region in the middle reaches of the Black Volta had been set aside for the cattle farming towns of Dokuy and Barani. There were holy conflicts in some places as a result of the Muslim revival in the early eighteenth century, which expanded from the Hausa territories to the Macina.

In the 1880s, another Marka, Amadou Deme (Ali Kari), from Boussé in the San country (Tougan), repeated the jihad that Mamadou Karantao, a Marka of Ouhabou, had started along the middle reaches of the Black Volta in the first half of the nineteenth century. The latter’s conflict with the French in 1894 ended in his death.

Arriving from the Dagomba nation on the left bank of the Niger, the mounted Muslim Zabermabe began invading the Gourounga country to the southwest of the Mossi kingdoms in 1860. The Nuna, Kassena, and Lyele traditions bear the permanent scars of their frequent attacks. Babato, one of their chiefs, even led a successful expedition into the Moaga nation.

Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Burkina Faso

Tieba Traore, King of Kenedougou (in present-day Mali), led multiple expeditions against the Toussian, Turka, Samogo, and other communities to the west and south of Bobo-Dioulasso. He was defeated at Bama in 1893 by a coalition of the Bobo, Dioula, and Tiefo, but his brother Babemba persisted in his expansionist strategy.

The change in power in the area was brought about by Samori’s entrance into what is now Côte d’Ivoire. His soldiers had a catastrophic effect along the cliff from Banfora to Toussiana, destroying Noumoudara in the process.

The 1890s marked the end of this region’s independence. After the Berlin Conference in 1885, it became a point of contention for three European powers: France, Britain, and Germany. Each of these powers sought to surpass its rivals in the Moaga country, which was renowned for its dense population and strong political structure.

In 1888, von François, a German captain, set out from Togoland with the goal of negotiating as many treaties as possible. But he had to turn around since he had arrived at the boundaries of the Mossi kingdoms. A French captain named Binger, meanwhile, lived at Oua Gadougou from June 15 to July 10, 1888, but all of his attempts to set up a “protection” contract were turned down.

With succeeding local leaders, neither Captain P. L. Monteil in 1891 nor Dr. Crozat in 1890 had any more success. Ultimately, on July 2, 1894, a man named Ferguson signed the first contract of “friendship and free trade” at Ouagadougou on behalf of the British, who wanted to protect their trading interests in the hinterland of their Gold Coast colony. The Yarse and Haousa merchants who did business with Salaga surely persuaded Wobogo, the chief, of the prudence of signing.

He agreed not to accept any protectorate or to conclude any agreement with any other foreign power without the consent of the British. At the beginning of 1895, the French enjoyed a diplomatic success in the Gulma country. Commandant Decoeur arrived there from Dahomey (Benin) and signed a treaty of “protection” with Bantchandé, a Nunbado, on January 20.

The Germans had also conducted negotiations, but with chiefs whose advisers acknowledged shortly afterward that they were dependent on Nungu. In the same year a French mission, led by Commandant Destenave, reached the Yatenga. Baogo, the Yatenga naaba, had been in power for ten years by then but had not yet succeeded in disarming his opponents.

Therefore, on May 18, 1895, he agreed to a “complete treaty” that included a French resident and escort. On November 1st of that year, this pact was renewed by his successor, the Yatenga naaba Bulli. Lieutenant Voulet was given orders to defeat the British in Ouagadougou and Sati, the Gourounsi capital, in 1896 while leading 500 soldiers.

Burkina Faso Burkina Faso

On September 1st of that year, an attack occurred on Ouagadougou, the capital of the monarch. After a few skirmishes, the French flag was flying over the capital’s palace by late afternoon. September 7, 1896, saw the defeat of a counterattack.

After that, the French seized power in the Gourounga nation, where Babato, a Zaberma, was battling Hamaria, a Gourounga ruler, in the Sati and Leo region. He had been forced to accept his good offices by Samori, who provided himself with horses in the Moaga area. On September 19, Hamaria, who was required to pay a tribute of horses, agreed to Voulet’s “protection” treaty.

1897 was a crucial year for the French invasion of the Upper Volta. Following the signing of a contract of protection on January 20, 1897, the French designed a candidate to succeed Wobogo in Ouagadougou, and the new leader, Sigiri, was properly invested in accordance with custom.

A Franco-German pact of July 23 established French sovereignty over the Gulma nation, and on September 11, Commandant Caudrelier and Barkatou Wattara, the Koubo and Lokhosso ruler, signed a covenant of protection at Lokhosso. Zelelou Sanon, the chief of Bobo-Dioula, resisted, but on September 25, Bobo-Dioulasso was taken over, and on November 23, an army garrison was established there. In 1898, however, British interests were protected by diplomacy.

A company of 200 soldiers led by Colonel Northcott marched on Ouagadougou in June of that year to demand that the treaty signed by Ferguson be recognized. However, he was forced to retreat after learning of the June 14 Conference of Paris’s results.

The 11th parallel, north latitude, was established as the border between French and British territory. To the north, the Fulbe and Tuareg continued to oppose Captain Minvielle, the French resident at Dori. The attitude of many people in the area is reflected in the answer of one Tuareg chief to the French invasion in August 1898: “My ancestors never surrendered; I shall never surrender.”

Burkina Faso Burkina Faso

The French aren’t doing anything incorrectly, but they’re also not doing anything correctly. Let them remain where they are if they desire peace. God owns the land, and God will choose what should happen to it. Nonetheless, this date could be considered the start of the colonial era in the future French colony of Upper Volta.

Also Read: Burkina Faso History: The Incredible History Of Africa’s Colonial Period

Brussels Conference

Brussels Conference Brussels Conference Brussels Conference

During the 1889–1890 Brussels Conference, the first comprehensive agreement to stop the African slave trade was signed. Although the Atlantic slave trade had stopped by this point, slave raids and trade were still common in Africa, and slaves were still taken to European colonies on false pretenses of contract labor or shipped to the Muslim world.

The British established a network of distinct treaties with the colonial and maritime powers, as well as with Asian and African governments and peoples, after outlawing their own slave trade. These treaties granted the right to search and established guidelines for the arrest and conviction of slavers.

Also Read: Scramble For Africa: The Struggle for Egypt and North Africa

Theoretically, these rights were frequently reciprocal, but only the British consistently exercised them, and other powers believed the British were attempting to obstruct their trade and colonial expansion. These treaties were outdated by the 1880s, when the “Scramble” for Africa was well underway, and there was no treaty with France.

Resistance was sparked by the colonial advance led by missionaries, traders, prospectors, and adventurers. Swahili/Arab traders and their African allies were bringing in large amounts of weapons and tearing up vast swaths of land where slaving and raiding were common, endangering British settlers on the shores of Lake Malawi, French missionaries near Lake Tanganyika, and King Leopold II of Belgium’s Congo Independent State’s posts in the far interior.

The imperial powers had to disarm them in order to enforce their control. The hitherto unimpressed home support for colonial endeavors was suddenly mobilized by the antislavery movement. Cardinal Lavigerie, the French founder of the missionary organization of the Society of Our Lady of Africa, or White Fathers, toured European capitals in 1888, urging volunteers to battle the slavers after David Livingstone’s earlier calls to stop the trade had inspired the British people.

King Leopold was asked to call a meeting of the European colonial powers to establish a new treaty against the export of slaves because the British wanted to maintain their position as leaders of the antislavery movement and were worried about the chaos that the cardinal’s “crusaders” would cause.

An invitation from London was more likely to raise suspicions than one from Brussels, and the notion was well-liked in Britain. At first, the British only aimed to keep competing nations—especially the French—from luring trade partners. By supporting the slave trade and the profitable armaments trade that fueled it, countries might also encourage trade in the interior at the expense of more moral neighbors.

In order to serve the interests of his fledgling realm, King Leopold was adamant about extending the planned treaty. Aside from the other signatories of the Berlin Act (Holland, Belgium, Russia, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, and the United States), all of the African colonial powers (Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the Congo, Italy, and Spain) had to be invited in order to accomplish these goals.

Brussels Conference Brussels Conference Brussels Conference

To avoid giving the impression that it was starting a Christian “crusade,” the Ottoman Empire—which possessed colonies in Africa and Asia and imported slaves—was included. Persia was chosen since it was a Muslim nation thought to be working against the slave trade, and Zanzibar was requested to appease its ruler.

Also Read: Scramble For Africa: The Struggle for Egypt and North Africa

According to the General Act for the Repression of the African Slave Trade of 1890, also referred to as the Brussels Act, the treaty that was hammered out stated that the colonial powers could best combat the slave trade by setting up their administrations, improving communications, safeguarding missionaries and trading companies, and enlisting Africans in the “industrial arts” and agricultural labor.

The signatories agreed to halt wars, cease the trade and raiding of slaves, prohibit the castration of men, and repatriate or relocate fugitive and freed slaves after establishing the exploitation of Africa as an antislavery policy.

They decided to restrict the movement of weapons between latitudes 20° north and 22° south. Slave imports and exports, the mutilation of men, and the release, repatriation, or care of illegally imported slaves were all prohibited by the Ottoman Empire, Zanzibar, and Persia.

The British agreed to limit their current search powers to ships weighing less than 500 tons and to limit their searches to a certain “slave trade zone,” which comprised a portion of the Persian Gulf, Madagascar, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean.

Signatories were to strictly regulate passenger movements and the issuance of flags to indigenous vessels in this area. Rules for the search and arrest of suspects were established in order to reduce conflicts. Although the French introduced legislation that essentially incorporated the ability to check and verify the flag, they declined to approve these elements.

Brussels Conference Brussels Conference Brussels Conference

A bureau in Brussels was to gather data on the steps taken to implement the pact and provide statistics on the trafficking of slaves, weapons, and alcohol, while another in Zanzibar was to distribute information that could result in the arrest of slavers.

The Berlin Act saw two changes. Liquor traffic between 20° north latitude and 22° south latitude was to be subject to duties where it already existed and to be completely prohibited in still “uncontaminated” areas in order to appease British temperance and missionary societies and assist the Royal Niger Company in maintaining control over trade on the Niger.

Also Read: Scramble For Africa: The Struggle for Egypt and North Africa

Similarly, a proclamation permitting import charges to be applied in the Congo’s traditional basin was inserted to the pact to help King Leopold fight off competing traders. In 1892, the Brussels Act became operative. The victorious allies, which included the United States, France, Belgium (now in control of the Congo), Portugal, Italy, Japan, and Britain, repealed it together with the Berlin Act in 1919. Although it ceased to exist in practice, it remained in effect for the other signatories in theory.

Three conventions that incorporated some of the arms, spirits, and economic sections were signed in 1919 at St. Germain-en-Laye, replacing the two acts. Only one piece mentioned the slave trade, which is said to have died out.

This obligated signatories to protect the welfare of indigenous peoples and ensure the total abolition of slavery in all its manifestations, including the slave trade. Reducing the slave trade was aided by a number of factors, including the Brussels Act.

It did not address the different means by which the European powers exploited Africans, such as contract and forced labor, and it lacked an enforcement mechanism. However, once their administrations were put in place, the colonial rulers’ interests in suppressing slave raiding, extensive slave trade, and slave exporting came to a stop.

Petty slave trafficking and a limited export business persisted in some regions until the end of colonial control, while slavery itself—which was not included by the act—was accepted for many years.

Brussels Conference Brussels Conference

Although the act benefited the colonial powers, it forced them to repress the slave trade after the Brussels convention brought its faults to the public’s attention. Humanitarians saw it as a victory and a significant development in the trusteeship philosophy. Its tenets were transmitted to the League of Nations and, eventually, to the United Nations.

Also Read: Scramble For Africa: The Struggle for Egypt and North Africa

British Togoland

British Togoland was a part of West Africa that shared a southern boundary with the Gulf of Guinea. Ghana now includes the western portion of Togoland, formerly known as British Togoland. The Conference of Berlin (1884-1885) recognized a German protectorate over Southern Togoland. Treaties with France (1897) and Great Britain (1904) established Togoland’s borders.

The Germans lost Togoland to British and French forces in August 1914. The area was split into French and British mandates by the League of Nations in 1922. The mandates were designated as UN trust territories in 1946. A total of 13,041 square miles (33,776 square kilometers) were under British control.

The southern portion became a district of the colony’s eastern province, while the northern portion was placed under the jurisdiction of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, Ghana’s former name. In May 1956, a vote was held in the southern portion to decide whether to join Ghana when it gained independence. British Togoland joined Ghana as an independent state in 1957.

As stated in its July 1922 treaty, the League of Nations said that the mandatory’s job was to “promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of its inhabitants, as well as the peace, order, and good government of the territory.”

Ethnic groups from British Togoland’s northern region also resided in the protectorate. The mandate granted the Gold Coast administration the authority to manage them collectively for this purpose. There were roughly 400,000 people living in the trust territory in 1946. In 1932, the districts of Kete-Krachi, Dagomba, Eastern Mamprussi, and Kumassi were included in the northern section.

Including most of this region, Eastern Dagomba’s primary industries were agriculture and cattle rearing, as well as crafts including ceramics, weaving, ropemaking, and leather tanning. However, compared to the Gold Coast, British Togoland lacked the mineral riches and extensive cocoa plants.

The uncertainty surrounding the region’s future made the British hesitant to invest in an area governed by a foreign power. The decentralization of native authority occurred between 1890 and 1930. Following 1930, the several smaller parts of North Togoland and the Northern Territories were combined to form a number of sizable states, including Mamprussi and Dagomba.

Three ordinances pertaining to financial, judicial, and executive restructuring were issued in 1933. These newfound powers allowed the chiefs to implement social and economic reforms. The chief commissioner was able to specify the scope of its civil and criminal jurisdiction by establishing tribunals under the Native Tribunal Ordinance.

Additionally, in 1932, the government passed the Native Treasuries Ordinance, which granted the chief commissioner the authority to create treasuries, specify the sources of income, set up particular taxing schemes, and more. Roads, dispensaries, sanitary facilities, and regular wages for chiefs and tribunal members were all funded with the money raised.

The region’s economy was growing gradually, and there was a gradual rise in interest in religion, health care, and education. A Northern Territory council of all of the chiefs was formed in 1946. At 5,845 square miles, South Togoland was substantially smaller. Southern Togoland was subject to the ordinances of the Gold Coast Colony, but Northern Togoland was subject to those of the Northern Territories.

District commissioners oversaw the mandate’s five districts. Similar to the Northern Territories, the government sought to integrate minor ethnic groups starting in 1930. Of the 68 divisions, all but 15 had united to form four sizable states by 1939. The governor then had the authority to designate local authorities, strengthening local institutions. State and divisional councils were acknowledged and given the authority to look into constitutional and political conflicts.

Each native authority area could have a tribunal set up by the governor. The divisions were given the authority to establish their treasuries and collect taxes by a decree of 1932. Under the mandate, missionaries, with financial support from the government, were in charge of education. The increased production of cocoa led to economic progress.

Conditions in Togoland started to alter after 1951 as a result of the Gold Coast’s constitutional reforms. With the greater representation granted by the 1951 and 1954 constitutions, the government had taken steps to guarantee that Togoland’s citizens were represented at all levels of government. After the Gold Coast gained independence, the British government told the UN in June 1954 that it would not be able to manage the trusteeship of Togoland independently.

The majority of UN members first opposed British Togoland’s creation as an independent state, but they quickly realized that this meant British Togoland would be governed as an independent African government rather than as a colonial annexation.

A British Togoland referendum was approved by the UN General Assembly in December 1955 to ascertain whether the people wanted their country to become a part of the Gold Coast following independence or to remain independent. Aware of its neighbor’s impending independence, the majority of voters in the May 9, 1956, plebiscite supported Togoland’s union with the Gold Coast.

Thus, with the independence of this final province, the UN General Assembly approved the reunion of British Togoland and the Gold Coast. In February 1957, the final constitution before independence was released. On March 6, 1957, the day of independence was set. On this day, Ghana, the amalgamated Gold Coast and British Togoland, gained independence within the British Commonwealth.

Also Read: Zambia History: The Incredible Evolution of Trade in Precolonial Zambia

Ramaphosa Suspends The Police Minister

Ramaphosa Suspends The Police Minister

Ramaphosa Suspends The Police Minister: In response to grave accusations made by senior police official General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa removed Police Minister Senzo Mchunu. Mkhwanazi charged Mchunu and Shadrack Sibiya, the deputy police commissioner, with conspiring with criminal syndicates and meddling in delicate investigations.
The suspension coincides with mounting apprehension around purported political meddling in important law enforcement organizations. The decision was made public by President Ramaphosa, who said, “I have decided to put the Minister of Police, Mr. Senzo Mchunu, on a leave of absence with immediate effect in order for the Commission to execute its functions effectively.” To help the commission function effectively, the minister has promised to fully cooperate with it.

Professor Firoz Cachalia has been named acting Minister of Police by Ramaphosa. Mkhwanazi further claimed that Mchunu and Sibiya dismantled a crucial crime-fighting squad that was looking into a series of murders with political motivations. According to reports, organized crime networks were connected to these murders.
The President also described the investigation’s parameters. According to Ramaphosa, “The commission will look into the role of current or former senior officials in certain institutions who may have provided financial or political support to a syndicate’s operations, failed to act on credible intelligence or internal warnings, or assisted or abetted the alleged criminal activity.”

Ramaphosa Suspends The Police Minister

The President has come under fire from opposition parties for not acting more forcefully. They contend that putting Mchunu on leave is insufficient to hold him accountable and have demanded that he be fired right away.

Also Read: Trump Meets Five West African Leaders To Talk Trade And Development.