Biafra War
The Biafra War. Within the first five years after it gained independence, Nigeria was confronted with a number of terrifying occurrences. The nation’s problems with regional and ethnic chauvinism, political intolerance, victimization, lawlessness, government incompetence and corruption, and nepotism all came to a head on January 15, 1966, when a military coup d’état took place.
The military takeover, which was intended to save the country from impending disintegration, was misunderstood as an Igbo plot to take control of Nigeria. The incompetence of General Ironsi, who was an Igbo and the ruler of a state, appeared to reinforce the suspicions of northerners of a planned Igbo takeover. Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon was installed as head of state following a countercoup that occurred on July 29, 1966. This coup resulted in the overthrow of General Ironsi.
In September and October of 1966, in the aftermath of this countercoup, Igbo people living in the northern area were brutally murdered. At the conclusion of this premeditated act of genocide against the Igbo people, nearly 10,000 of their people had been killed. Several thousand more individuals were injured or deprived of their property, and 1.5 million people were forced to flee their homes and become refugees within their own nation.
The criminals who were responsible for this horrible act were not brought to justice, and the victims did not get any form of recompense. The inability of the government to put an end to the atrocities persuaded the Igbo that the only place where they could be sure of their safety was in the eastern area, which was commanded by an Igbo named Lieutenant Colonel Emeka Ojukwu.
Given these circumstances, the eastern portion of Nigeria did not acknowledge Gowon as legitimately holding the position of head of state in Nigeria. All efforts at mediation, both inside and outside of Nigeria, were ultimately unsuccessful due to a mix of factors, including ill faith, mutual distrust, deceit, and the incompatible styles of Ojukwu and Gowon.
For instance, an excellent chance for the peaceful resolution of the situation arose in January 1967 when General Ankrah, the military head of state of Ghana, intervened in the issue. This presented itself as a fantastic opportunity for the peaceful resolution of the problem. In order to settle the issues that existed between Ojukwu’s administration and Gowon’s federal government, he called a conference of the Nigerian Supreme Military Council on January 4 and 5, 1967, and held it in Aburi, Ghana.
The following resolutions were approved at the Aburi conference: the non-use of force in the resolution of the crisis; a confederal status for the regions without boundary adjustments; a veto power for all members of the supreme military council that would enjoin a unanimous concurrence of the regions before any major decision could be taken; the payment of salaries to all displaced persons until March 31, 1967; and finally, the head of the federal military government should assume the position of the commander-in-chief of the armed The chances of there being peace in Nigeria were, however, just temporary. After conducting an in-depth analysis of the Aburi pact, federal government employees informed General Gowon that Ojukwu had successfully outwitted him.
Gowon began to have second thoughts about the deal, and on March 17, 1967, he issued Decree No. 8, in which he rejected several of the measures that were included in the Aburi agreement.
In response, Ojukwu dismissed Decree No. 8 as invalid. As a result, the groundwork for a confrontation between the military rule of the federal government and the eastern area had been laid. At the end of March 1967, Ojukwu issued a series of edicts in an effort to protect the economic interests of the region. The United States government responded to the region’s continued economic instability by imposing economic sanctions.
The confrontation lasted until May 26, 1967, when Ojukwu called a meeting of the Eastern Region Consultative Assembly and the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders in Enugu. Both of these groups were comprised of senior citizens. Ojukwu was given the authority to proclaim the eastern area an independent sovereign state on May 27 when the assembly released a communiqué giving him that authority. The new state was to be called the Republic of Biafra.
The Nigerian federal administration moved quickly, taking action the same day to divide the country into twelve states. In accordance with Decree No.14, which censored the press and prohibited participation in political activities, Gowon was granted extensive new powers. Ojukwu’s proclamation of the Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967, was the moment that brought the so-called “cold war” to its climactic point.
The move was deemed invalid by the federal government, and it was immediately made plain that the administration intended to put an end to the secession. In addition to this, it began an extensive campaign of military mobilization and acquisition of armaments. Ojukwu started a campaign of propaganda in Enugu, which was the capital of Biafra. He said that no power in black Africa could beat Biafra.
On July 6, 1967, the federal government began an offensive against Biafra that consisted of two distinct parts. Biafra showed an initial vigorous fight against the invasion of the federal government from its northern border at Nsukka, but it continued to struggle with a lack of supplies of ammunition throughout the conflict. Within a week and a half, the Biafran troops were driven out of the university town of Nsukka by the military of the federal government. The Biafrans put up a poor fight against the superior artillery and firepower of the federal soldiers stationed at the GarkemOgoja front.
Biafra continued to endure hardships as a result of a lack of available armament. Biafra was hampered by a naval embargo, a lack of international assistance, and internal conflict, whereas the federal authorities were able to draw upon their immense personnel and material resources. Independence was bound to fail despite the magnificent performances of the Biafran people via technical inventiveness and steely persistence. A significant portion of the Biafran populace perished as a result of starvation.
At the beginning of the war in Biafra, it is believed that between 3,000 and 5,000 people a day were killed there. Towards the end of the conflict, this number increased to approximately 10,000 per day. By July of 1968, the federal government had successfully taken control of the majority of Biafra’s strategic and significant towns. In spite of this, Biafra was able to salvage some measure of success by retaking Owerri in April of 1969.
Biafra, on the other hand, did not have the resources necessary to build on its gains. Around this time, Biafra had been reduced to a size that was one-third of what it had been originally. The uprising in Biafra was put down on January 11, 1970, when General Ojukwu escaped to the neighboring country of Côte d’Ivoire.
On January 15, General Gowon recognized Major General Philip Effiong’s unconditional surrender of Biafra and said that there was “no winner and no vanquished.”
Gowon’s post-civil war rehabilitation was half-hearted, incongruous with the goals that his administration had publicly stated, and little more than window dressing to assuage the international community’s concern about reprisals against the Igbo. The Igbo people were subjected to discrimination once more in Nigeria during Gowon’s rule, and they were given unfavorable peace terms by the federal government that ultimately emerged triumphant.
At the conclusion of the civil war, authorities in different regions of the country determined that they had deserted their estates. They were not allowed to return to their old places of employment because of this decision. In the years following the end of the civil war in Nigeria, the future of the Igbo people is still uncertain.
