The South African, or Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902 is a pivotal moment in South African history since it both ended British imperial control of contemporary South Africa and set the stage for the establishment of a segregationist union state in 1910. British soldiers ended the territorially based Boer (Afrikaner) settler republicanism after a costly and wasteful conflict in the most widespread colonial conflict of the late Victorian “new imperialism.”
In order to secure dependable Boer allies who would defend Britain’s crucial imperial interests in South Africa, Britain then turned to rebuilding and reconciliation with its erstwhile radical nationalist opponent. Disgruntled African residents, many of whom had hoped in vain for enhanced rights after Britain’s victory, paid the price for conciliation between white colonial society and the British Empire.
The finding of gold in the Boer Republic in 1886 and the effects it had on the balance of power in South Africa in the late nineteenth century were the catalysts for the start of the war. When the Witwatersrand mines of the South African Republic (Transvaal) overtook the weak and insignificant agrarian Boer republics in little more than a decade, South Africa’s economic center of gravity shifted away from the coastal British colonies of the Cape and Natal toward an increasingly nationalist, republican Boer state.
The British interests were severely hampered by Transvaal strength. It provided a pathway for pro-Boer imperial opponents to challenge the Royal Navy’s strategic control over the Southern African coastline and exercise their commercial and political might within a traditional British area of influence.
However, the Paul Kruger-led South African Republic government was allied with a conservative landowner elite that took advantage of the mines’ profits but was otherwise not very warm to the country’s changing economic system. The enfranchisement of British Uitlanders (foreigners) with mining backgrounds on the Witwatersrand, a political reform required by Britain as a tactic to construct a more proimperial political framework, was a liberalizing weakening of the Boer ruling class’s monopoly of power.
Disgruntled mining entrepreneurs came to the conclusion that the Transvaal regime’s overthrow was the only way to guarantee the long-term efficiency and prosperity of the gold mines as a British concern. It was also becoming untenable for many imperial politicians and bureaucrats for a great power to be challenged by a small African settler state administered by an independent group of Dutch farmers.
Every geopolitical scenario that followed the 1895 Jameson Raid, a failed attempt to overthrow the Kruger administration by certain scheming businessmen and bluffing imperial politicians, pointed toward war. At the end of the 1890s, when diplomacy ran out of options, a belligerent Britain and a besieged Transvaal—now allied militarily with its sister republic, the Orange Free State—had no choice but to resort to force.
The anti-imperialist Boers declared war on Britain in October 1899 to protect republican independence. Their command took the initiative in an effort to delay the British before reinforcements arrived to fortify the frail garrison position. The Boer goal was to force a negotiated settlement by surprise and coercion. A terrible shock was delivered to metropolitan spectators who had anticipated a quick and straightforward war of conquest.
In the initial phase of hostilities, Boer soldiers advanced well into British colonial territory, handing numerous significant losses to poorly equipped and incompetently commanded British troops, and raising a great deal of controversy at home on the shortcomings of imperial authority.
However, the Boer attack did not serve as a demonstration for effective leadership either. The republican command was unable to capitalize on their early advantages because they became mired down in unnecessary side trips, which gave the British time to feed in a lot of troops, reorganize, and better adjust to the challenging circumstances of the wide South African countryside. Early in 1900, British soldiers started to turn the tide under more capable command, mounting a coordinated attack to seize the Boer nations.
By June, their much outnumbered adversary had been driven back, and the retreating Boer field troops started to break down under duress due to their inability to prevent their areas from being captured. Lord Roberts, the supreme commander of Britain, thought the war was over after gaining control of the Transvaal and Orange Free State State. However, a strong group of republicans from the younger generation remained loyal to the fight.
The Boer enterprise was revived by skillful irregular warfare by mounted troops led by resourceful individuals like Louis Botha, Jan Smuts, and Christiaan de Wet, who were inspired by the resolute Boer women. Dispersed commandos waged a guerrilla battle for over two years, attacking on the run and sabotaging the imperial occupying force.
The British commander, Lord Kitchener, used broad theories of colonial wars of conquest against rural opponents to cut off the Boers from the lifeline of support and sustenance sent forth by their farming populace. The imperial army implemented a broad “scorched-earth” tactic throughout the second part of the conflict, destroying crops, cattle, and thousands of farms.
Thousands of African refugees who had also been uprooted by scorched-earth policies were ushered into segregated black camps while displaced women and children were herded into concentration camps. High death rates were a result of the appalling detention circumstances, and when hostilities concluded, 28,000 Boers and at least 20,000 Africans had died, mostly from illness.
Even the most ardent (or bittereinder) leaders’ will to battle on was finally sapped by Britain’s unwavering desire to suppress Boer republicanism and the immense imperial resources employed to this purpose. Two other significant reasons made their situation worse.
Many Boers had lost hope in their cause and were either giving up their weapons or joining the British Army as cooperating National Scouts to battle their former countrymen. As a result, the conflict broke apart Boer society. Second, residents who were African and “colored” (mixed race) were increasingly defying Boer rule and supporting the British war effort.
Boer military chiefs capitulated and reached an agreement for peace in May 1902 as the struggle threatened to wipe out the very Boer life it had been started to preserve. Even though the republican governments were forced to give up their independence, Britain generously provided postwar rebuilding funding, which resulted in the founding of the Union of South Africa in 1910 as a white imperial dominion. By the time the war was over, Britain had sent close to 450 000 troops, while the Boers had sent out roughly 70,000 men. 22,000 imperial soldiers as well as 7,000 Boer men died.
A extra toll of black casualties as a result of fighting can be added to this. The Anglo-Boer War was never straightforward, as black people were heavily employed by both sides as laborers and combat support personnel.
While the British used over 100,000 black individuals in their war effort, up to 40,000 of them carried weapons, the Boers recruited well over 10,000 men to serve commandos. In this sense, the conflict was a real South African War, and because of its political and social ramifications, it was never accurate that the majority of black population was neutral in the so-called “white man’s war.”
